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Abstract
Government healthcare expenditures have been growing much more rapidly than GDP in OECD coun-
tries. How much of this growth is due to demographic change versus increases in benefit levels (ex-
penditures per person at a given age)? This paper answers this question for ten OECD countries –Aus-
tralia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S. using data
from 1970-2002. Growth in benefit levels explains 89 of overall healthcare spending growth in the ten
countries over the period, with Norway, Spain, and the U.S. recording the highest annual benefit
growth rates. As we show, allowing government healthcare benefit levels to grow at historic rates is
fraught with danger given the impending retirement of the baby boom generation.
Key words: Healthcare expenditure growth, long-term fiscal imbalance.
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1. Introduction
As is well known, government healthcare expenditures in developed countries have been
growing much more rapidly than have their economies. What is less well known is how
much of this expenditure growth is due to demographic change and how much is due to in-
creases in benefit levels, i.e. health expenditures per person at a given age1. The distinction
Hacienda Pública Española / Revista de Economía Pública, 188-(1/2009): 55-72
© 2009, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
∗ Corresponding author: Christian Hagist, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Freiburg University), D-79085
Freiburg, Germany (Fax +49-761-203-2290, christian.hagist@vwl.uni-freiburg.de). We would like to thank the
German Merit Foundation (Deutsche Studienstiftung) and the Hamburger Foundation (Hamburger Stiftung für in-
ternationale Forschungs- und Studienvorhaben) for financial support. Furthermore, we gratefully acknowledge
helpful comments from Stefan Fetzer, Bettina Hagist and two anonymous referees. All errors remain our own.is important. Benefit levels are determined by government policy, whereas demographics are
largely outside government control. Policymakers who ignore or misjudge the growth in
their benefit levels do so at their country’s risk. They are left with only a vague understand-
ing of why their health expenditures grew in the past and very little ability to project how
they will grow in the future.
This study uses OECD demographic and total health expenditure data in conjunction
with country-specific age-health-expenditure profiles to measure growth in real healthcare
benefit levels between 1970 and 2002 in ten OECD countries –Australia, Austria, Canada,
Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S. Among these nations, Nor-
way, Spain, and the U.S. recorded the highest growth rates in benefit levels. Norway’s rate
averaged 5.04 percent per year. Spain and the U.S. were close behind with rates of 4.63 per-
cent and 4.61 percent, respectively. Canada and Sweden had the lowest growth rates
–2.32 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively.
Benefit growth, even among countries with the lowest benefit growth rates, has played
the major role in raising total government healthcare spending in recent decades. Over the
32-year period covered by our data, total healthcare spending grew 2.5 times faster than
GDP, on average, across the ten countries2. Had there been no benefit growth, healthcare
spending would still have grown because of demographics, specifically changes in the age-
composition of healthcare beneficiaries and increases in the total number of beneficiaries.
But with no growth in real benefit levels, healthcare spending in our ten countries would
have grown, on average, only one fifth as fast.
Going forward, growth in real benefit levels will likely continue to play the key role in
determining overall increases in healthcare spending. This is not to negate the importance,
going forward, of demographics. In 2002 the share of the population 65 and older in our ten
countries averaged 14.8 percent. By mid century it will average 25.9 percent –a 75 percent
increase! Table 1 shows how the population share of the elderly will change in our ten coun-
tries through 2070. Japan, which is currently the oldest of our countries, will retain that rank-
ing, ending up in 2070 with 37.7 percent of its population age 65 or older. The U.S. will also
retain its ranking as the youngest of the ten countries. Its 2070 elderly share is projected at
21.6 percent –not much larger than the current elderly share of the Japanese population.
Since healthcare benefit levels are much higher for the elderly than they are for the
young, continuing to let benefit levels grow as a country ages will accelerate the increase
in healthcare spending. In the U.S., for example, real government healthcare spending in-
creased by a factor of 6.9 between 1970 and 2002. If real benefit levels continue to grow at
historic rates, real U.S. healthcare spending will increase by a factor of 7.5 over the next 42
years. Absent growth in real benefit levels, the U.S. total real healthcare expenditures
growth factor would have been 1.6 between 1970 and 2002. And absent future benefit
growth, the factor will be 1.8 over the next 32 years. So demographics matter to overall
healthcare spending, but they are swamped in importance by unchecked growth in real ben-
efit levels.
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the next 40 years and at the rate of labor productivity thereafter entails present value
healthcare expenditures totaling almost 12 percent of the present value of all future GDP.
By comparison, Japan’s government is now spending only 6.7 percent of the nation’s out-
put on healthcare. In the U.S., government healthcare spending now totals about 6.6 per-
cent of GDP. But if Uncle Sam continues to let benefits grow for the next four decades at
past rates, it will end up spending almost 18 percent of American’s future GDP on health-
care.
The difference between the Japanese 12 percent and U.S. 18 percent figures is remark-
able given that Japan is already much older than the U.S. and will age much more rapidly
in the coming decades. The difference accentuates the obvious –disproportionate growth in
benefit levels can be much more important than aging in determining long-term healthcare
costs. Moreover, the fact that the present value of projected U.S. healthcare expenditures is
so high –indeed, the highest of any of our 10 countries when measured relative to GDP–
suggests that the U.S. may be in the worst overall fiscal shape of any of the OECD coun-
tries even though its demographics are among the most favorable. The paper proceeds by
describing our methodology, presenting our data, discussing our findings, examining their
long-term fiscal implications, and reiterating the importance of controlling growth in ben-
efit levels.
2. Methodology
Let Et stand for the value of real healthcare expenditures in a country in year t and write 
(1)
where ε i,t indicates healthcare expenditures per head of age group i at time t and Pi,t repre-
sents the population age i at time t. OECD (2004a) provides past population counts for the
age groups 0-14, 15-19, 20-49, 50-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, and 80 plus. The subscript i ref-
erences these age groups.
We assume the profile of age-specific health spending is constant through time and nor-
malize the age-profile of average expenditures by dividing by average expenditures of age
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57 Who’s going broke? Comparing growth in Public Healthcare Expenditure in ten OECD countriesIn what follows, we treat absolute average real expenditures of age group 50-64 as the
country’s benefit level. Letting b stand for the base year, 1970, and assuming benefit levels
grow at a constant annual rate, we have
ε 50-64,t = ε 50-64,b (1+λ )t-b (3)
Use (2) and (3) to rewrite (1) as
(4)
Note that in the base year, t=b, so given the value of base-year aggregate healthcare
spending (Eb), knowledge of the age-health expenditure profile (the α is), and the base-year,
age-specific population counts (the Pits), we can use (4) to determine – ε 50-64,b. Setting t=2002
in (4), we can determine the value for λ . Given a value of λ  for each country we can accom-
plish our paper’s first two goals, namely comparing benefit growth rates across countries and
decomposing total healthcare expenditure growth into the part due to benefit growth and the
part due to demographics.
The recovered values of λ  are also used to meet our third objective –projecting future
aggregate government healthcare spending in the ten countries. In forming these projec-
tions we use Bonin (2001)’s demographic program, which projects population by single
age3, and equation (4) to determine future values of Et. In using (4), we a) take the base
year b to be 2002, b) treat age group i as representing a single age of life, rather than as an
age range and c) determine the value for ε 50-64,2002 by setting t=b=2002. Where sex- as
well as age-specific relative healthcare expenditure profiles are available we also distin-
guish the age groups by sex. This is the case for Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany,
Norway and the U.S. We summarize the size of each country’s projected future aggregate
healthcare expenditures by comparing its present value with the country’s present value of
GDP, with both present values measured over the infinite horizon. In projecting GDP we
assume that real per capita GDP grows in the future at the average rate observed in each
country over our sample period– 1970 through 20024. In forming present values of both
future healthcare spending and future GDP, we consider real discount rates of 3, 5, and 7
percent. Unfortunately, we have only limited and recent data on healthcare expenditures
by age for the ten countries. Hence, we are not in a position to investigate fully the extent
to which age-healthcare-expenditure profiles have changed through time and are likely to
change in the future. If improvements in medical treatments and outcomes make the age-
healthcare expenditure profile steepen over time, the overall benefit growth rate we calcu-
late will overstate benefit growth at younger ages and understate it at older ages. If im-
provements in medical treatments and outcomes make the age-healthcare-expenditure
profile flatter over time, the opposite will be true5. In either case, it’s not clear whether and
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OECD (2004a) reports aggregate annual real public healthcare expenditures, valued at
1995 prices, for the years 1970 to 2002. As mentioned, the OECD also provides population
counts for the eight age groups. We were able to obtain age-healthcare expenditure profiles
for each country for either 2000 or 2001 from different academic and governmental sources.
Data for Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. come from the following respec-
tive government agencies: the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2004), the Minis-
ter of Public Works and Government Services Canada (2001), the German Federal Insurance
Authority (2003), the United Kingdom Department of Health (2002), and the Centers for
Medicaid and Medicare Services (2003). Austria’s profile comes from Hofmarcher and
Riedel (2002). Japan’s profile comes from Fukawa and Izumida (2004). These authors also
generated profiles for earlier years and conclude that the age-specific distribution of Japan-
ese public health expenditure did not change significantly over the past decade. Norway’s
profile comes from Fetzer, Grasdal, and Raffelhüschen (2005) who analyze the Norwegian
health sector within a Generational Accounting framework. Profiles for Spain and Sweden
are based on the work of Catalán et. al. (2005) and Ekman (2002), respectively. 
3.1. Age-relative expenditure profiles
Table 2 present our age-relative expenditure profiles. The profiles decline with age at
young ages. This reflects the costs of birth, vaccinations, infant care, and other treatments
for young children. From age group 15-19 on, all profiles rise6. At older ages the slope of
the profiles varies significantly across countries. In Austria, Germany, Spain, and Sweden,
expenditures per head on those 75-79 and 80 plus are only twice the level of expenditures
per head of the reference age group (50 to 64 years). At the other extreme, we have the U.S.,
where the oldest old receive benefits that average 8 to 12 times those received by members
of the reference group. In between these two extremes we have Japan, Norway, the UK,
Canada, and Australia, where the relative spending factors for the old range from 4 to 8.
Unlike the other countries, the U.S. government does not provide healthcare to the en-
tire population7. Instead, it covers the lion’s share of the healthcare costs of the very poor
and of those over 65. It does this through its Medicaid and Medicare programs8. Medicare
participants are primarily 65 and older, while Medicaid participants are primarily younger
than 65. Hence, the shape of the age-government healthcare expenditure profile for the U.S.
reflects, to a large extent, the fact that Medicaid covers a relatively small fraction of the pop-
ulation at any age, and certainly under 65, whereas Medicare covers everyone 65 and over.
Stated differently, for age groups under 65, the average values of government health expen-
ditures used to form the U.S. profile are averages over the entire population at a particular
age, including those not eligible for Medicaid and, therefore, receiving no benefits.
If we consider the age-health expenditure profile simply of those over 65, we find the
U.S. still spending a relatively large amount on the very old, but not dramatically more than
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expenditure is 1.7 in the U.S. and 1.8 in the UK. That said, the fact that the U.S. profile is so
steeply inclined, after age 65, compared to other county profiles and that so many people will
be moving into the older age groups augers for very rapid overall healthcare expenditure
growth in the U.S.
3.2. Population projections
Our population projections incorporate age-specific mortality rates, age-specific fertili-
ty rates, net immigrations rates, initial age distributions of the population, age-specific net
immigration rates, and assumptions concerning the future development of these variables.
These country-specific data come from the website of the national statistic office or census
bureau of the country in question as well as from the websites of Eurostat and of the Popu-
lation Division of the UN. Our projections differ only slightly from the medium variant pro-
jections of the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat (2005).
4. Findings
Table 3 compares real levels and real growth rates of per capita government healthcare
expenditures, benefits, and per capita GDP over our sample period. A quick glance at
columns 3, 6, and 9 in table 3 shows two things. First, growth in per capita healthcare ex-
penditures significantly outpaced growth in per capita GDP in all ten of our OECD coun-
tries. Second, the growth rate of benefit levels is very close to the growth rate of per capita
expenditures in each country, indicating that growth in benefit levels (benefits at a given
age), rather than changes in the age composition of the population or the fraction of the pop-
ulation eligible for benefits is primarily responsible for overall growth in expenditures per
capita. Table 3 also indicates that public healthcare expenditures now represent from 5.45
percent to 8.56 percent of GDP in the ten countries.
In 1970 Sweden recorded the highest level of per capita government healthcare spend-
ing, namely $940 measured in 2002 dollars. Norway’s government, in contrast, spent almost
one third less per person in that year. But by 2002, Norway’s per capita expenditures totaled
$3,366, surpassing Sweden’s 2002 $2,128 amount by almost three fifths. This change re-
flects Norway’s much higher benefit growth rate. Over the 32 year period, Norway’s bene-
fit level grew at an annual real rate of 5.04 percent, whereas Sweden’s real benefit level grew
at only 2.35 percent per year.
Norway recorded the highest growth in benefit levels over the period followed by Spain
with a growth rate of 4.63 percent and the U.S. with a growth rate of 4.61 percent. A second
set of countries –Australia, Austria, Germany, Japan, and the UK– registered lower, but still
very high, benefit growth rates, ranging from 3.30 percent to 3.72 percent. The remaining
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ing 2.32 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively. The fact that Canada and Sweden appear at
the bottom of the benefit growth ranking is not surprising given Canada’s and Sweden’s use
of rationing to limit healthcare spending9.
What explains the high rates of benefit growth in these countries? The health econom-
ics literature connects benefit growth to costly product innovations10. A good example here
is Spain’s acquisition of CT scanners. As reported in OECD (2004a), Spain had only 1.6 CT
scanners per one million inhabitants in 1984 compared with 11 per million in the U.S. By
2001 Spain had 12.3 CT scanners per one million inhabitants vs. 12.8 in the U.S.11. Japan
also expanded its use of medical technology over the 32 year period. Indeed, Japan appears
to now have the largest number of CTs of any developed country12. Of course, technology
doesn’t arise spontaneously. It is acquired, and at considerable cost. The willingness of de-
veloped economies to pay larger shares of income for advanced medical technology as well
as medications suggests that health is a “luxury good”, with an income elasticity greater than
one13. This, indeed, is the case. The income elasticity calculated by taking the ratio of the
benefit growth rates in column 6 of table 3 to the per capita GDP growth rates in column
9 range from 1.14 in Canada to 2.29 in the U.S. On average, this elasticity equals 1.73.
Another source, at least for Austria, Spain and the U.S. as reported in OECD (2004a),
could be the coverage of public health systems, which grew quite significantly from 1970
on. This could bias our analysis, as the constant age-profile assumption would eventually
even more venturous as discussed in section 2. However, as Hagist (2008) has shown, for
the U.S. this effect is only little in magnitude. For Austria and Spain we calculate the growth
of benefit levels from 1986 to 2002, as since the mid-1980s coverage in both countries is
nearly 100 per cent. It turns out that these growth rates are significant lower than the ones
reported in table 3 (for Austria, λ is calculated with 1.97 per cent compared to 3.72 per cent,
for Spain the difference is only one percentage point). This does not mean coercively that
our growth rates estimation are wrong but that we probably overestimate the level of public
health expenditure in our projections in the following sections. For the U.S. this is not the
case as coverage is still not near 100 per cent of the population so coverage could still be a
driver of the growth of public health expenditure.
Table 4 indicates the share of total benefit growth over the 32 year period that’s attrib-
utable to demographics. The table’s first three columns present total healthcare expenditure
growth rates, total healthcare expenditure growth rates absent growth in benefit levels, and
overall GDP growth rates. The last two columns present ratios of healthcare expenditure
growth rates to GDP growth rates with and without benefit growth.
Total real healthcare expenditure growth averaged 4.89 percent per year across the
ten countries. Had there been no growth in benefits, this average would have equaled only
1.23 percent. Hence, three quarters of healthcare expenditure growth can be traced to
growth in benefit levels. During the same period that healthcare spending was growing at
4.89 percent per year in these ten countries, real GDP was also growing, just not as rap-
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age, the rate of healthcare growth exceeded the rate of GDP growth by a factor of 1.70.
Absent benefit growth, this factor would have equaled only 0.42. As the first column of
Table 4 records, the U.S. clocked the highest annual average real growth rate of aggre-
gate benefits at 6.23 percent per year. This growth rate is 2.01 times the corresponding
3.10 percent GDP growth rate. Had U.S. benefit levels not grown, U.S. government
healthcare spending would not have grown twice as fast as the economy, but only half as
fast. In addition to the U.S., Norway, Australia, and Spain all recorded growth rates of
total real health expenditures in excess of 5 percent per year. Among all ten countries,
Sweden had the most success in keeping healthcare spending from growing faster than
the economy. But even in Sweden growth in healthcare spending outpaced growth in out-
put by a factor of 1.45.
4.1. Sensitivity analysis
How sensitive are our estimated benefit growth rates to the shapes of the age-benefit
profiles? This question is important given that classification of health expenditures by age
may differ across countries14. One way to examine this issue is to calculate benefit growth
rates using an “average” profile. To produce this profile, we estimated a polynomial using
relative benefits by age for nine countries. We excluded the U.S. because its public health-
care covers a minority of the population15. 
Table 5 compares the benefit growth rates implied by this polynomial age-benefit pro-
file. As is clear from column 3, the use of this alternative profile does not materially alter
calculated benefit growth rates. Indeed, the difference in computed growth rates differs at
most by 0.3 percentage points. Take Australia, for example. Its value of λ is 3.66 percent
using its own profile and 3.60 percent using the “average” profile. Spain has the largest dif-
ference. Its calculated growth rate falls from 4.63 percent to 4.32 percent. Remarkably, even
the U.S. calculated benefit growth estimator remains largely unchanged in using what for the
U.S. is clearly the wrong profile.
4.2. Changes over time in age-benefit profiles
In the case of Canada, we have a 21-year (1980-2000) times series of age-benefit level
profiles. Figure 1 shows how these profiles have changed over time. They change, but not
much and with no clear trend. In 1980, the public health care costs per head for an over 85-
year-old Canadian was 14.4 times larger than that for a representative 50-64-year-old per-
son. This value peaks in 1988 at 16.0; in 2000, it equals 14.3. Using the actual 1980-2000
profiles shown in Figure 1 we estimate a 1.4 percent growth rate in real benefit levels in
Canada over the 21-year period. Assuming a constant profile for this time period produces a
1.8 per cent real benefit growth rate. So our bias due to the assumption of constant profiles
equals, in the case of Canada, 28 per cent.
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Table 6 examines the present value budgetary implications of permitting benefit levels to
continue to grow at historic rates. For reference, the second column presents 2002 healthcare
spending as a share of 2002 GDP. The remaining columns show, for different discount rates, the
present values of projected future healthcare spending relative to the present value of GDP. The
four sets of columns assume that benefit levels grow at historic rates (see column 7 of table 3)
for the number of years indicated at the top of the columns and then grow at the same rate as per
capita GDP (see the last column of table 3). We consider real discount rates of 3, 5, and 7 per-
cent. A 3 percent discount rate may be most appropriate given the low prevailing rates of long-
term inflation indexed bonds in the U.S. and abroad. On the other hand, the spending streams
being discounted are uncertain, which suggests using a higher discount rate to adjust for risk.
These projections should not be taken as “real” projections but more as a simulation baseline.
Consider first columns 3-5 –the case that benefit growth is immediately stabilized.
Under this assumption Canada and Germany have the largest present value costs when
scaled by the present value of GDP. The reasons are three. First, both countries have rela-
tively high current benefits, which they provide to their entire populations. Second, both
countries are slated to age very significantly. And third, and most important, both countries
have very steep age-benefit profile. 
Next consider the size of scaled healthcare costs if benefit levels continue to grow at his-
toric rates for 40 years. In this case, the U.S. has the highest scaled costs for discount rates of
3 and 5 percent. At a 7 percent discount rate, Norway takes first place. Interestingly, Austria
turns out to be the low scaled present value cost country at each discount rate. At a 3 percent
discount rate, Austria’s cost is 9.48 percent of future GDP. This is much lower than, for ex-
ample, Germany’s 14.99 percent cost figure. Since Austria and Germany have very similar
demographics, historic benefit growth rates, and age-benefit profiles, what explains the dif-
ference? The answer is that Austria has a significantly higher historic growth rate of per capi-
ta GDP. Hence, the denominator in Austria’s cost rate –the present value of future GDP– is
relatively high compared to that of Germany. At a 3 percent discount rate, the U.S. is project-
ed to spend 18.85 cents of every present dollar the country produces on its two healthcare pro-
grams –Medicare and Medicaid. At a 7 percent discount rate, the figure is 14.98 cents on the
present value dollar. Given that the U.S. government is now spending 6.57 percent of GDP,
this projection implies a huge additional fiscal burden on the American public. Norway is in
similar shape in terms of its healthcare costs, but Norway does not have to bear the burden of
paying for a large military. In addition, it has significant oil wealth to help cover its costs.
The comparison between Japan and the U.S. is quite interesting. At a 3 percent discount
rate Japan’s costs are 12.95 percent of future GDP compared with 18.85 percent. At a 7 per-
cent discount rate the respective figures are 10.17 percent and 12.51 percent. How can the
U.S. have so much higher present value costs when Japan is already so old and will end up
much older than the U.S. will end up? The answer is that Japan has a lower benefit growth
rate, a higher per capita GDP growth rate, and a much flatter age-benefit profile. Turn next to
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at historic rates for just 20 years leads to a 13.24 percent cost at a 3 percent discount rate. This
figure is quite high on its own and also quite high relative to the 18.85 percent cost that aris-
es with 40 years of benefit growth. The message then is that letting benefits grow at historic
rates even on a relatively short-term basis is extremely expensive. It locks in high benefit lev-
els for years and generations to come. Finally, consider the 60 benefit growth scenario. In this
case, at a 3 percent discount rate, the U.S. ends up spending 26.42 cents of every present dol-
lar the economy generates on its government healthcare programs. Not far behind are Nor-
way, which spends 22.99 cents, Germany, which spends 17.44 cents, and Australia, which
spends 17.15 cents. The lowest costs, again, are those of Austria, which spends 11.05 cents.
6. Conclusion
Growth since 1970 in aggregate healthcare spending by our ten OECD governments re-
flects first and foremost growth in benefit levels (healthcare spending at any given age). In-
deed, three quarters of overall healthcare expenditure growth and virtually all of growth in
healthcare expenditure per capita reflect growth in benefit levels. Although OECD countries
are projected to age dramatically, growth in benefit levels, if it continues apace, will remain the
major determinant of overall healthcare spending growth. The very rapid growth in benefit lev-
els documented here is clearly unsustainable. No country can spend an ever rising share of its
output on healthcare. Benefit growth must eventually fall in line with growth in per capita in-
come. The real question is not if, but when, healthcare benefit growth will slow down.
Raising benefit levels is one thing. Cutting them is another. If OECD governments spend
the next three decades expanding benefit levels at their historic rates, the fiscal repercussions
will be enormous. The fiscal fallout is likely to be particularly severe for the United States.
Like Norway and Spain, its benefit growth has been extremely high. But unlike Norway,
Spain, and other OECD countries, the U.S. appears to lack both the institutional mechanism
and political will to control its healthcare spending. America’s elderly are politically very well
organized, and each cohort of retirees has, since the 1950s, used its political power to extract
ever greater transfers from contemporaneous workers16. The recently legislated Medicare
drug benefit is a case in point. Although the present value costs of this transfer payment is
roughly $10 trillion, not a penny of these costs is slated to be paid for by the current elderly.
There is, of course, a limit to how much a government can extract from the young to ac-
commodate the old. When that limit is reached, governments go broke. Of the ten countries
considered here, the U.S. appears the most likely to hit this limit.
Notas
1. Breyer and Ulrich (2000) and Seshamani and Gray (2003) examine growth of health expenditures in Germany,
Japan, and the UK. 
64 CHRISTIAN HAGIST Y LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF2. This 1.8 factor is obtained by averaging the ten country-specific ratios of A to B, where A is the 1970-2002
growth rate of real healthcare expenditures and B is the 1970-2002 growth rate of real GDP.
3. Bonin (2001)’s projection program is based on the component method proposed by Leslie (1945). The stan-
dard procedure has been extended to distinguish between genders and to incorporate immigration. 
4. This may overstate somewhat likely future growth in per capita output given the aging of the work force [see
Benz and Fetzer (2004)]. If so, we will understate future healthcare expenditures as a share of future GDP. 
5. There is a growing literature on how medical advancements will affect healthcare spending at different ages
and for different cohorts. See, for example, Buchner and Wasem (2004) or Breyer and Felder (2004),
Zweifel, Felder and Meiers (1999), Zweifel, Felder and Werblow (2004), Stearns and Norton (2004), and
Miller (2001).
6. In some of our profiles in table 2 this is not the case. This is due to the structure of the reported data in some
countries which is stated not per cohort but also per age group, sometimes very large ones (0 to 19 years). In
such cases, the profile is flat for the first two age groups.
7. Strictly speaking, Germany has no universal health insurance scheme. However, all but 10 percent of the pop-
ulation are insured by statute. Of those not statutorily insured, the largest group consists of civil servants
whose “private” insurance plan is financed in large part by the government.
8. For a detailed description of the U.S. public health insurance scheme see Iglehart (1999a, 1999b, 1999c).
9. In the case of Canada Walker and Wilson (2001) show that waiting times for certain treatments in Canada in-
creased over time and Naylor (1992) speaks of implicit rationing through waiting lists. For the Swedish situ-
ation see for example Svenska Kommunförbundet (2004). However, as one of our referees pointed out, in the
Swedish case this could also be due to a trend to convergence as Sweden had the highest health care spending
per capita in the beginning of the 1980s.
10. See Newhouse (1992) and Zweifel (2003).
11. The number for this year is not reported for Australia. The most recent Australian number in OECD (2004a)
is 20.8 CT scanners per one million inhabitants in 1995. This comparatively high number is probably due to
Australia’s special geographic situation.
12. See also Reinhardt, Hussey and Anderson (2002) for this point.
13. For a discussion and an overview about several studies concerning income elasticities of healthcare expendi-
tures, see Roberts (1999).
14. See Reinhardt, Hussey and Anderson (2002).
15. The curve is estimated as 0.28 + 0.05*agegroup*agegroup while agegroup is measured discretionary (1 to 8).
This leads to the following α ’s: α 0-14=0.33; α 15-19=0.48; α 20-49=0.73; α 50-64=1.08; α 65-69=1.53; α 70-74=2.08;
α 75-79=2.73 and α 80+=3.48. We then normalize these α ’s to the reference age group and derive a benefit
growth rate reported in table 5.
16. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2003) show very nicely how public spending among age groups in the U.S. has
developed since the 1950’s .
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67 Who’s going broke? Comparing growth in Public Healthcare Expenditure in ten OECD countriesResumen
En los países de la OCDE el gasto público en sanidad ha crecido mucho más rápido que el PIB. ¿Cuán-
to de este incremento se debe al cambio demográfico frente a un aumento en el nivel de prestación san-
itaria ofrecido (gasto por persona por grupos de edad)?
Este trabajo responde a esta pregunta para diez países de la OCDE –Australia, Austria, Canadá, Ale-
mania, Japón, Noruega, España, Suecia, Reino Unido y Estados Unidos utilizando datos de 1970 hasta
2002. Para todo el grupo de países analizado, el aumento en el nivel de prestación sanitaria explica el
89% del crecimiento del gasto público en sanidad, siendo Noruega, España y Estados Unidos los que
registran un mayor incremento anual en el nivel de prestaciones. Demostramos también que permitir
el crecimiento sostenido en el nivel de prestaciones sanitarias tiene peligro a largo plazo en países en
los que se producirá la jubilación masiva de la llamada generación del baby-boom.
Palabras clave: crecimiento gasto público en sanidad, desequilibrio fiscal a largo plazo.
Clasificación JEL: H51, I11.
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Table A.1
SHARE OF THE ELDERLY POPULATION (65+) IN PER CENT
OF TOTAL POPULATION
Country 2002 2030 2050 2070
Australia 12.2 20.4 24.0 25.2
Austria 15.5 24.4 29.1 31.1
Canada 13.0 23.6 26.7 27.1
Germany 17.1 26.3 30.6 31.3
Japan 18.0 29.9 36.8 37.7
Norway 15.1 21.0 23.6 24.5
Spain 16.2 24.2 34.0 30.0
Sweden 17.2 25.5 28.5 29.3
UK 15.9 22.9 26.1 27.3
US 12.4 19.1 21.3 21.6
Source: Own calculations based on United Nations (2005).
Table A.2
AGE-SPECIFIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROFILES
(IN REFERENCE TO THE 50-64 YEARS OLD)
Age groups
Country
0-14 15-19 20-49 50-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80 +
Australia 0.60 0.57 0.64 1.00 1.81 2.16 3.90 4.23
Austria 0.28 0.28 0.46 1.00 1.42 1.75 1.98 2.17
Canada 0.43 0.61 0.65 1.00 2.45 2.44 4.97 7.54
Germany 0.48 0.43 0.58 1.00 1.52 1.80 2.11 2.48
Japan 0.44 0.22 0.43 1.00 1.70 2.20 2.76 3.53
Norway 0.57 0.34 0.52 1.00 1.70 2.21 2.69 3.41
Spain 0.57 0.39 0.48 1.00 1.46 1.73 1.97 2.11
Sweden 0.43 0.43 0.63 1.00 1.50 1.50 1.96 1.99
UK 1.08 0.65 0.76 1.00 2.07 2.07 3.67 4.65
US 0.88 0.82 0.77 1.00 5.01 5.02 8.52 11.53
Source: See first paragraph of section 3.
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COMPARING GROWTH IN PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (I)
Public Health Expenditure Benefit levels per capita GDP per capita 








rate p.a. rate p.a. rate p.a.
Australia 362 1,323 4.13% 428 1,351 3.66% 11,916 20,813 1.76%
Austria 393 1,375 3.99% 587 1,890 3.72% 11,830 25,570 2.44%
Canada 589 1,552 3.08% 647 1,350 2.32% 12,073 23,072 2.04%
Germany 663 2,066 3.62% 842 2,377 3.30% 14,804 24,143 1.54%
Japan 457 2,082 4.85% 741 2,274 3.57% 14,419 31,194 2.44%
Norway 645 3,366 5.30% 772 3,722 5.04% 16,032 42,032 3.06%
Spain 175 855 5.08% 252 1,074 4.63% 7,477 15,688 2.34%
Sweden 940 2,128 2.59% 1,192 2,511 2.35% 15,833 26,994 1.68%
UK 528 1,694 3.71% 466 1,383 3.46% 13,474 26,298 2.11%
US 481 2,364 5.10% 334 1,415 4.61% 19,076 36,006 2.01%
Source: Own calculations.
Table A.4
COMPARING GROWTH IN PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (II)
2. Real Healthcare
1. Real Healthcare Expenditure growth Ratio of  Ratio of 
Country Expenditure rate absent
3. Real GDP
column (1)  column (2)
growth rate growth in benefit
growth rate
to column (3) to column (3)
levels
Australia 5.61% 1.96% 3.21% 1.75 0.61
Austria 4.23% 0.51% 2.68% 1.58 0.19
Canada 4.28% 1.96% 3.23% 1.32 0.61
Germany 4.62% 1.32% 2.52% 1.83 0.52
Japan 5.50% 1.94% 3.07% 1.79 0.63
Norway 5.82% 0.78% 3.57% 1.63 0.22
Spain 5.79% 1.16% 3.03% 1.91 0.38
Sweden 2.92% 0.57% 2.01% 1.45 0.28
UK 3.91% 0.45% 2.31% 1.69 0.20
US 6.23% 1.61% 3.10% 2.01 0.52
Source: Own calculations.
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COMPARING GROWTH RATES IN REAL BENEFIT LEVELS
Country
Based on country- Based on Difference
specific profiles average profiles (percentage points)
Australia 3.66% 3.60% 0.06%
Austria 3.72% 3.65% 0.07%
Canada 2.32% 2.46% –0.14%
Germany 3.30% 3.17% 0.13%
Japan 3.57% 3.83% –0.26%
Norway 5.04% 4.97% 0.07%
Spain 4.63% 4.32% 0.31%
Sweden 2.35% 2.20% 0.15%
United Kingdom 3.46% 3.35% 0.11%
United States 4.61% 4.71% –0.10
Source: Own calculations.
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Figure A.1. Development of the Canadian age-specific health expenditure profile
Source: Own calculations based on Minister of Public Works/Government Services Canada (2001).72 CHRISTIAN HAGIST Y LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF
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